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N. Vyas and C. Benjamin (arXiv:1701.08573[quant-ph]) propose a new mixed strategy for the
(quantum) Hawk-Dove and Prisoners’ Dilemma games and argue that this strategy yields payoffs,
which cannot be obtained in the corresponding classical games. They conclude that this refutes the
earlier assertion by S.J. van Enk and R. Pike that the quantum equilibrium solution is present in
a corresponding extended classical game. This paper argues that the scheme suggested by N. Vyas
and C. Benjamin changes the rules of the original game, and hence it does not refute the argument
put forward by van Enk and Pike.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is known that in many tasks quantum-mechanical
protocols have genuine advantage over classical ones.
However, there are cases where the advantage is only
apparent. In the past, it has been proposed that extend-
ing classical games into the quantum domain can lead to
emergence of novel features. In particular, in [1] it was
argued that entanglement shared by the players in con-
junction with a certain set of quantum operations gives
rise to a new Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
(PD), thereby resolving the inherent contradiction of the
classical game (as the new equilibrium is also Pareto-
optimal). Their approach was criticised on the grounds
that it does not solve the original classical game, because
the quantum version of the game is, in effect, equivalent
to a different new classical game with extended payoff
matrix [2].
Recently, Vyas and Benjamin [4] claimed to have re-
futed van Enk-Pike’s assertion. They used a mixed strat-
egy on a maximally entangled state and argued that the
solution yields payoffs which cannot be replicated in the
classical game. They analyse the Hawk-Dove game in
the main part of the paper and then draw an analogous
conclusion in the Appendix. The aim of this comment is
to show that there is a flaw in their argument, and hence
that van Enk-Pike’s assertion still stands.
II. THE ORIGINAL PROTOCOL AND VAN
ENK-PIKE’S ARGUMENT
Here I briefly outline the scheme proposed in [1]. This
scheme was subsequently modified [3] for the Hawk-Dove
game.
At the first stage of the game, two qubits, denoted
by A, B, are prepared by the arbitrator in a maximally
entangled state
|ψPDin 〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 − i|11〉. (1)
The state, which is known to Alice and Bob, is then dis-
tributed between the players: Alice and Bob get qubits
A and B respectively.
At the second stage, Alice and Bob both independently
choose from a set of three operations, O ∈ {Cˆ, Dˆ, Qˆ},
which correspond to the unitary operators I, iY and iZ
with Y and Z being the respective Pauli operators.
At the third stage, the qubits are sent back to the ar-
bitrator, who performs a disentangling unitary operation
exp{−ipiY ⊗ Y/4}, measures each qubit in the computa-
tional basis and thus determines the payoffs.
In the spirit of [1], we assign the possible outcomes
of the classical strategies (Cooperate or Defect of the
original PD) to values 0 and 1 obtained as a result of the
measurement, and the payoffs are calculated according
to the payoff matrix
A\B 0 1
0 (a, a) (0, b)
1 (b, 0) (c, c)
with b > a > c > 0.
As it was pointed out in [2], both players are choosing
from three strategies, C, D or Q, and the payoffs can be
represented as being assigned according to the extended
payoff matrix
Alice\Bob C D Q
C (a, a) (0, b) (c, c)
D (b, 0) (c, c) (0, b)
Q (c, c) (b, 0) (a, a)
Hence, van Enk and Pike concluded that the quantum
scheme of [1] does not solve the original classical game.
Instead, it presents an extended game with new rules,
which can be represented as a classical game with a new
(extended) payoff matrix.
A similar argument can be made about the Hawk-Dove
game.
2III. VYAS-BENJAMIN’S ARGUMENT
Vyas and Benjamin [4] introduce a mixed strategy on a
maximally entangled state and argue that it yields pay-
offs which cannot be replicated in the classical Hawk-
Dove game. They extend their argument to the Prison-
ers’ Dilemma.
Again, I will refer to the Prisoners’ Dilemma for the
ease of reference. The core of my argument equally ap-
plies to the Hawk-Dove game, which takes the central
stage in [4]. The random strategy is played using the
initial state
|ψRin〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉. (2)
Alice acts on |ψRin〉 with identity operator I with proba-
bility p and with flip operator X with probability 1− p.
Bob does the same with probabilities (q, 1− q). This re-
sults in |ψRf 〉. The payoffs are calculated as the mean
values of payoff operators
PA = 3|00〉〈00|+ 5|10〉〈10|+ |11〉〈11|
PB = 3|00〉〈00|+ 5|01〉〈01|+ |11〉〈11|, (3)
and hence
$A(p, q) = Tr(PA|ψRf 〉〈ψRf |)
= $B(p, q) = Tr(PB |ψRf 〉〈ψRf |)
=
1
2
(4− 2pq + p+ q),
(4)
which attains its maximal value of $(1, 0) = $(0, 1) = 2.5.
The authors then compare this result with the payoffs
achieved in the original scheme (outlined in Sec. II) with
a = 3, b = 5, c = 1 and refer to the (combined) quantum
payoff matrix shown in Table I.
Alice\Bob C D Q R
C (3, 3) (0, 5) (1, 1) (2.5, 2.5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1) (0, 5) (2.5, 2.5)
Q (1, 1) (5, 0) (3, 3) (2.5, 2.5)
R (2.5, 2.5) (2.5, 2.5) (2.5, 2.5) (2.5, 2.5)
TABLE I. Combined payoff matrix constructed in [4].
.
This lead them to conclude that the payoffs corre-
sponding to strategy R cannot be replicated in the orig-
inal classical game.
I can see two problems with their analysis. Firstly,
Table I does not seem to represent a payoff matrix
of a single game. The entries of the 3 × 3 submatrix
correspond to the payoff achived when the parties
follow the steps of Sec. II, which involves acting on
the entangled state (1), which is different from (2), and
using a particular disentangling operation before the
payoffs are ‘measured’ [through applications of (3)]. In
order to make a sensible comparison with the fourth row
and column of Table I, we would need to assume that
Alice and Bob use the same resource (i.e. state (2)) and
no disentangling operation is performed. But in this
case the submatrix becomes
Alice\Bob C D Q
C (2, 2) (2.5, 2.5) (2.5, 2.5)
D (2.5, 2.5) (2, 2) (2.5, 2.5)
Q (2.5, 2.5) (2.5, 2.5) (2, 2)
which replicates the payoffs achieved by strategy R.
Secondly, a special care should be taken of the fourth
row and the fourth column of Table I. Alice and Bob
choose p and q to maximize their payoffs given by (4).
For the entry R\R the payoff of (2.5, 2.5) can only be
guaranteed if both Alice and Bob agree on their choice
of (p, q) = (1, 0) or (0, 1) in advance should they (individ-
ually) decide to play R. This choice will affect the rest
of entries, so with (p, q) = (0, 1), say, the entry C\R will
become (2, 2), because Alice will act with Cˆ = I, which
will not achieve the maximum of (4).
To summarize, in order to work within the definition of
a particular game, a mixed stratergy must operate within
the space of the pure strategies of that game, which does
not seem to be the case here. New strategies define new
game.
IV. CONCLUSION
By introducing the mixed strategy R, Vyas and Ben-
jamin inevitibly change the rules of the game, hence they
do not solve the original game. Moreover, their extended
4 × 4 matrix can be replicated in a classical game - the
matrix defines the game. Thus, Vyas and Benjamin do
not seem to have succeded in refuting the argument put
forward by van Enk and Pike in [2].
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